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For the last few years, economic literature has shown a new stream of analysis, at the crossroads of 
the heterodox tradition and cognitive sciences. A new approach is born, called Cognitive 
Economics, since attention is focused on the study of individual and organizational learning, seen as 
a key factor in shaping social phenomena (Rizzello, 2000). 
This new stream of analysis aims at refounding economic methodologies, starting from more 
realistic hypotheses than those at the basis of the mainstream. Therefore, empirical observation of 
real men and women's learning and decision making is necessary. Experimental economics, as the 
main way to gather data on these aspects, is essential for the development of such an approach. At 
the moment, though, there is still a lack of methodological discussion on how to perform 
experiments. 
This chapter aims at analyzing the relation between experimentalism and cognitive approach in 
economics. As it will be shown, cognitivism implies and requires methodological and procedural 
peculiarities - as compared with the mainstream - in the realization of experiments and in the 
analysis of the relative data. 
These differences depend, first of all, on the fact that, though it is deep-rooted in social sciences, 
this can be considered a new-born discipline with obvious different necessities from those of an 
older science. At the moment, in fact, empirical analysis should here be directed mainly towards the 
gathering of empirical evidence, instead of comparing alternative models to find the most fitted one. 
The importance of this descriptive interest is also related to the goal of understanding reality, and 
not just building models with predictive capacity. 
One of the main questions suggested by the cognitive literature, a question which raises many 
theoretical and empirical problems, is the heterogeneity of human agents. Ceteris paribus 
hypotheses cannot be simply posed and accepted, but should be tested and verified. Differences 
among subjects should, in fact, be studied and understood. But this goal requires new instruments 
and new kinds of analysis. 
For example, if individuals differ, a similar experimental treatment can bring to different 
behaviours. A macro analysis could then lead to conclude that a variable is not relevant, because 
positive and negative effects can compensate each other at a mean level. But the "mean agent" 
could make no sense. 
Some new devices and tools are available to carry on the study. New kinds of experiments, 
psychological tests and interviews have been recently developed and tested. Also the interaction 
between experimentalism and computational economics and its simulations can be very useful.  
Simulations with artificial agent is a growing and promising area of research; but the heterogeneity 
of human agents makes it difficult, at the moment, to perform such models, without looking at the 
real world. The risk would be, again, that of a science disconnected from reality. 
 
The following discussion is necessarily preliminary. At the moment there are many questions 
opened and few definite answers, but some promising results give courage in the work started. 
This chapter aims also at raising a necessary methodological discussion on the general experimental 
methods. Some of the problems which emerge while conducting experiments based on a cognitive 
approach can, in fact, be relevant in more general terms. 
 
This work is organised in the following way. The first paragraph proposes some methodological 
and historical notes on experimental economics and singles out a specific new-born cognitive stream of studies. Some peculiarities seem to characterize papers that can be related to this 
approach. 
Then a series of methodological and procedural problems and results are discussed through the 
presentation of two experiments conducted at the Centre for Cognitive Economics, in Alessandria. 
The first one is designed to study individual learning. It helps us demonstrating that a detailed 
analysis of each player's individual data is necessary and useful. The second one is directed to 
investigate team learning and to show two possible tools, i.e. psychological tests and interviews.  
Paragraph 3 proposes some considerations on the relation between simulations with artificial agents 
and experiments. Conclusions follow. 
 
1. Experimental economics and Cognitive Economics, some historical and methodological 
notes 
 
1.1. An Historical perspective 
 
Usually three main areas of research are supposed to characterize the development of experimental 
economics (see, for example, Roth, 1993): 
- experiments on markets, 
- experiments on human reasoning and decision-making (mainly focused on von Neumann and 
Morgenstern's theory of expected utility), 
- experiments on the theory of games. 
Novarese and Rizzello (1999) individuate a fourth, very recent and - at the moment - less 
developed, stream: the one focused on individual and organisational learning and, more generally 
on cognitive economics. The main papers to recall now are Cohen and Backdayan (1991), Egidi and 
Narduzzo (1997), Novarese and Rizzello (2002). 
 
This classification is obviously arbitrary, as it often happens in this case. Consider two examples, 
showing how a different classification could be used. 
- The theory of games has been used to model market mechanisms or individual decision-making 
and learning, i.e. the issues that define the other areas. 
- Cognitive Economics is strictly related to important experiments classified in the stream on 
decision making (see Rizzello, 2000), such as Allais (1953), or Kahnemann e Tversky (1979 and 
1992). 
Yet, the proposed classification is useful to evidence origins and specificity of the different 
disciplinary areas that gave birth and favoured the development of experimental economics, 
influencing its methodological evolution. In this sense, for example, the theory of games had a 
fundamental role in stimulating the realization of experiments and the debate on them, during the 
50’s and thanks to the Rand Association (see Innocenti, 1995).  
Similarly, it seems then useful to separate the fourth stream from the others, because of its novelty, 
in terms of methodological and procedural aims and problems, and also because of the hypothesis 
under investigation. 
 
1.2. A methodological perspective 
 
Even if sometimes the mainstream has considered it as a minor discipline, experimental economics 
has often been, directly or indirectly, put at the service of the neoclassical approach and it has also 
affected its methodological development. Different examples could be proposed. Consider these 
ones, here. Other notes will be presented later. 
John Hey (1991), one of the most important scholars in this field, states that experimentalism allows 
testing economic models under ceteris paribus hypotheses. Then Economics can test its models just 
as sciences such as Physics or Chemistry do.  Hey and Darnanoni (1988) show that, even if subjects use rules of thumbs to take decisions, in an 
experiment on consumer behaviour, they make the optimal choiche, "as if" they were able to 
maximize. The theoretical model under analysis seems then perfectly able to survive the test of the 
real world. Experiments are used to test this fact
1. 
 
In introducing one of the first papers of the new approach, Egidi and Narduzzo (1997) underline a 
different point: experiments make it possible to gather empirical evidence (for example on learning 
processes) on aspects otherwise almost impossible to observe (in the field). One of the main 
difficulties is the tacitness and opacity of mental mechanisms for the individual himself. For this 
reason, there are problems in the use of standard psychological experimental tools (like protocol 
analysis, for example) and different tools are required. 
Since the cognitive approach aims to be close to reality, experimental contests are here usually more 
complex. As Hey (1991) suggests, in fact, usually experimental economics deals with simple 
situation, because that is the requirement of the theories. 
Take for example the studies of Allais (1953), and Kahnemann e Tversky (1979 and 1992). They 
are interested in criticising the theory of expected utility. This model represents, obviously, the 
main point of reference in their experimental setting. But it also becomes the cornerstone on which 
the performance of their alternative model (the prospect theory) is built and compared. Then 
individuals are called to face different kinds of (implicit or explicit) lotteries and of similar 
situations, in which they are generally perfectly informed on all relevant probabilities and numerical 
data necessary to choose. In the real world, these situations (that according to Knight, 1921, are 
characterized by risk, as opposed to uncertainty) are yet very uncommon. 
Novarese and Rizzello or Egidi and Cohen's experiments are very different, as individuals build 
their knowledge in a context characterized by uncertainty and, even if well defined hypotheses are 
tested, there is no model according to which the laboratory framework is designed. 
 
Other differences inevitably follow. In what I call "traditional experiments", attention is usually 
focused on the possible differences among treatment groups. In the other stream, even if there are 
treatments, there is also a strong descriptive stress. As subjects face complex tasks (and not just 
simple hypothetical market or game sets), and as experimenter aims at building models of the real 
learning processes and decision making (and not just to compare different theories), players' 
behaviour is seen as interesting in itself and analyzed also beyond treatment groups. 
These practices are coherent with the recalled idea of experimental economics as a mean to gather 
data on aspects otherwise difficult to study. The researcher is interested in understanding why 
subjects behave in the way they do. So, attention is also focused on individual data and not only on 
macro phenomena. 
Probably, these differences also reflect the different stages in the development of the two 
approaches and the resulting differences in their needs. On the one hand there is the mainstream, 
with long years of development, on the other hand there is a new-born discipline. 
 
Following sections show some examples of analyses, results and problems related to the new 
"cognitive experimental economics". 
It is useful to anticipate the main methodological problems faced and their major effects. These 
problems are suggested by both the empirical practice and the cognitive science itself. While they 
are probably more important in relation to the new approach, they have also a more general 
applicability. 
Laboratory, even with all usual cautions, can hardly be a neutral place, in which individuals forget 
their usual lives (as sometimes, some experimentalists seem to hope).Their lives are not those of 
                                        
1 As in laboratory it is possible to satisfy ceteris paribus conditions, experimental economics could also be in contrast 
with econometrics, the discipline born to test economic models using data gathered from nature’s, uncontrolled, 
experiments. Therefore experimental and field data are sometimes seen as contrasting. neoclassical agents. On the contrary are lives full of ideas, beliefs, knowledge, and information. All 
of these elements differ in different players, as they are linked to and dependent on their personal 
attitude, experiences, studies, jobs and so on. And all of these differences enter the laboratory and 
guide players' behaviour
2. 
If players were the agents of neoclassical economics, furthermore, experiments would be useless, as 
results would be, obviously, identical to those reached in the models! 
 
As we will see, many different factors influence players' behaviour. All these factors cause loss of 
control and increase variability among players. 
It should be underlined that people can react in different ways to the same treatments because of 
problems related to social experimentation, and also because of their personal differences, which 
experiments (luckily) cannot cancel. 
As we will see in the following sections, aggregated data can sometimes be inevitably misleading, 
as they picture a mean player that is different from each real player. To understand how people 
behave, it becomes then necessary to study each individual case. 
The following Herbert Simon’s (1992, p. 20) methodological remarks on the analysis of the firm 
seem then useful also in relation to experiments: 
 
If you are trying to understand what firms are and how they operate, you will learn a lot from this kind of very 
detailed study of the processes of decision … Of course, we should not stop with five firms. Biologists have 
described millions of species of plants and animals in the world, and they think they've hardly started the job. 
Now, I'm not suggesting that we should go out and describe decision making in a million firm; but we might at 
least get on with the task and see if we can describe the first thousand. That doesn't immediately solve the 
aggregation problem, but surely, and in spite of the question of sampling, it is better to form an aggregate from 
detailed empirical knowledge of a thousand firms, or five, than from direct knowledge of none. But the latter is 
what we have been doing in economics for too many years 
 
 
2. Learning, individual behaviour and methodological problems in experiments 
 
2.1. An experiment on individual learning 
The first example proposed is an experiment on individual learning. Additional notes and results on 
this experiment and on its theoretical framework are presented in Novarese and Rizzello (2002), on 
which this section is partly based. 
Here the attention is focused mainly on its methodological aspects. In particular, two issues are 
dealt with: 
- significant differences among individuals can arise even within the same treatment groups; 
- an individual-based descriptive analysis can be very useful to understand macro results. 
                                        
2 A simple example is the well-known tendency of economics students to free-riding. They bring the mentality learned 
in their books into the experiments, behaving much more egoistically than other people (see, for example, Franck et al, 
1993).  
Consider also the following Andreoni (1995)'s statements, very representative of the mainstream experimental approach 
under many respects: 
"laboratory experiments are designed to be neutral and to minimize social effects like kindness. Hence, regular public-
goods experiments may already be eliminating a large amount of subjects' natural tendency to be cooperative …" 
(p.900) but "social and cultural propensities for kindness and generosity must clearly be very strong, and that such 
motives cannot easily be removed from experimenters simply by providing neutral environments and pledges of 
anonymity" (p. 892)  
2.1.2. The experiment 
Participants were given the following instructions: 
A subject has to take a series of exams. Each of these exams should be evaluated as: very good, 
good, middle, bad, very bad. If the subject scores very good or good, he’ll pass the exam. If he 
scores bad or very bad he will not pass the exam. If he scores middle he will have to repeat the 
exam. 
Each exam is evaluated with a new system of score; it receives: 
- a colour (black, blue, white or yellow) 
- a shape (heart, circle, square or rectangle) 
- a dimension (big or small) 
Then, for example, an exam could be evaluated as blue - heart - small 
- The connection between shapes-colours-dimensions and the final result of the exam is not known 
 
Then the game worked in this way (through a specific software): 
- the subject was presented the first combination of shape-colour-dimension, 
- he had to choose one of the possible scores, 
- he was informed whether his answer is right or not and which is the right solution; 
- he was presented another combination; 
- and so on for 231 rounds. 
 
Between the combinations of information and the right answer there is a logical relation, stable for 
all rounds, described in Table 1
3. 
 
Table 1. Logical relation between combinations and results 
 
Score colour  shape  Dimension 
very good  bright (white and yellow)  not  angular  shapes  (circle 
and heart) 
Big 
good  bright (white and yellow)  not  angular  shapes  (circle 
and heart) 
Small 
dark (black and blue)  not  angular  shapes  (circle 
and heart) 
middle 
bright (white and yellow)  angular shapes (square and 
rectangle) 
small or big 
Bad  dark (black and blue)  angular shapes (square and 
rectangle) 
Small 




At the beginning of the session, players do not know the relation between information and results. 
So they have to find it. 
As the game is based on a relatively small number of sequences of information (there are 4*4*2=32 
different combinations of shapes-colours-dimensions, and the same combination appears many 
times during the game), subjects might try to remember them. In this case, the results of the 
experiment would be scarcely interesting, more artificial and conditioned by the fact of being in a 
laboratory. Therefore subjects were not explicitly told that there were fixed and repeated sequences 
(while they were informed of the existence of a logical relation between information and results). 
Remembering 32 sequences is, besides, not easy. 
                                        
3. The categories of color and shape are not explicitly used in the presentation of the game to the players.  
This experiment presents a few similarities with those belonging to the so-called "diagnostic task" 
series. Kelley and Friedman (1999), for example, asked the participants in their experiment to 
forecast the price of a good. The price was determined according to a linear stochastic process with 
two independent variables. Players know the model, but ignore its parameters. In each of the 480 
rounds of the experiment, they have to forecast the price, after seeing the changing values of the 
independent variables. After each round they get information on the real value of the price. 
Kelley and Friedman's experiment is built to test the least square models of learning (see, for 
example, Marcet and Sargent, 1989), where economics agents are expected to be able to estimate 
the parameters of a known models. According to their goal, then, Kelley and Friedman test the 
accuracy of their players' implicit estimates. 
In Novarese and Rizzello (2002) there is a quite different idea of learning, seen - as in the 
psychological literature - as the human capacity to modify behaviour in a more or less permanent 
way, whenever new experience is acquired. 
Then, as a first point, experimental subjects do not know the model used in the experiment (as in the 
real world usually happens), but they have to create their own knowledge. Moreover, subjects are 
not expected to understand the real relation in table 1, as, in our view, there is learning even if they 
develop a wrong system of rules. Even a wrong model of the world, in fact, allows them to face a 
the given environment. 
Data are then analyzed in a different manner. There is no model to test and there is no analysis of 
the convergence on true parameters. The aim is mainly that of collecting empirical evidence and 




The experiments were realised at the Centre for Cognitive Economics in Alessandria in October 
2000. Sixty-four subjects (students in Law, with no Economics background) participated
4. 
 
Three main aspects can be detected among subjects: 
1) the tendency to confirm wrong answers to given combinations of information; 
2) the tendency to change right answers, even after many right choices; 
3) the tendency to develop (right and also wrong) rules. 
 
These features characterize all subjects, but their specific content differs. In other words, not all 
subjects confirm the same wrong choice or change the same right one. 
 
Table 2. An example of confirmation of wrong answers and change of right choice 
round colour  shape  dimension  correct  result 
subject’s 
result 
9 yellow  rectangle  Big  Middle  middle 
16  yellow square  small  Middle  good 
33  yellow square  small  Middle  good 
43 yellow  rectangle  Big  middle  very  good 
50  yellow square  small  middle  good 
60 yellow  rectangle  Big  middle  very  good 
67  yellow square  small  middle  good 
 
                                        
4 Similar results were obtained in a pilot experiment realized in March 2000 in Alessandria with a smaller group of 
subjects remunerated with money. The same experiment, but with a different frame, was replicated in July 2002. All 
main findings have been confirmed and new evidence has emerged Table 2 helps to understand the first two points. 
As said, a single combination of shape-colour-dimension appears many times during the game 
(never in two rounds running). 
By taking into account all the answers a subject gives to a particular combination, we can count the 
number of wrong answers and the number of times wrong choices are confirmed. 
For example, the sequence yellow-square-small (bold type in table 2) appears four times in the part 
of game showed. The participant in the experiment exemplified here confirms the same wrong 
answer after the three errors in the table. Then, we can say that he confirms 3 errors after 3 wrong 
choices (100% of confirmation). It’s possible to calculate a similar rate for all the combinations 
faced by a player and to determine a mean individual value. 
Table 3 shows the distribution of this rate among players
5 and the relevance of the phenomenon 
under exam. 
 





 64  players
 
Table 2 shows also the sequence yellow-rectangle-big. At its first appearance, player 1 gives a right 
answer (round 9) but in the following one he makes a wrong choice. Then we can say that (at round 
43) he does not confirm a right solution. 
Many other players show a similar behaviour in many cases and for different combinations. There 
are players who give a right answer to the same sequence for four or five (or even more) rounds and 
then change it, till the end of the game. 
Table 4 shows, for the whole of players, the number of right answers "forgotten" in at least two 
following appearances. For example there are thirteen cases in which some players give the right 
answer to a given sequence in four subsequent rounds but later, in the following two (or more) 
appearances of the same information, they make a wrong choice. 
 
Table 4: number of right answers "forgotten" in at least two following appearances related to 










It is useful, now, to concentrate on the last part of the game, and see if players develop regularities 
of behaviour and if they understand the rationale of the game. 
As a first step, it is necessary to give a definition of rule (specific for this experiment). Take into 
account the third part of the game (the last 77 rounds), where many sequences appear three or four 
times. 
For each sequence we can count how many times a subject gives the same answer: 
- "rule 75" means that the subject gives the same answer 75 percent of the times; 
                                        
5 As shown in Novarese and Rizzello (2002), these results can hardly be explained with subjects’ bad memory. - "rule 100" means that the subject gives the same answer 100 percent of the times. 
The idea is that if a player gives always or almost always the same answer when faced with the 
same sequence, he has probably developed a kind of routine
6. 
 
There is wide heterogeneity among players, but most of them develop very routinized behaviour. At 
a mean level, 70 percent of the possible "rule 100" are developed. Some players develop all possible 
rules. 
Does this mean that most of the subjects have understood the game? No, because players tend also 
to develop wrong rules (15 or 16 percent of the total), as shown in table 5. 
 
Table 5 Percentage of rules (total and wrong) developed by experimental players, mean 
values* 
  rule 75 Rule 100
total percentage of rules developed  75% 70%
Percentage of wrong rules developed  16% 15%
* Values are computed only for the sequences that appear at least four times during the whole game 
 
It is interesting to see that the mean time taken to answer to "rule 100" (wrong or right) is lower 
than the overall mean time. The mean time for a reply to a rule is, in fact, about six seconds, while 
the overall mean time is about ten seconds. A shorter reaction time is one of the features that denote 
a routine (Cohen et al, 1996). 
 
2.1.4. Understanding the empirical findings 
Is it possible to understand why players behave in this, apparently strange, way? Why do they seem 
to act so irrationally? Are the three tendencies related? 
To try to give an answer to such questions, it is necessary to look at each player. A generalized 
analysis is, in fact, incomplete, as the development of each experiment is very different from the 
others. An individual analysis, instead, in many cases seems to allow a full comprehension of the 
cognitive processes undertaken by the player. 
 
Take into account the player in table 2. As seen, he confirms several times the wrong answer 
“good” to the sequence yellow-square-small. He does not confirm the right answer to the sequence 
yellow-rectangle-big. Table 6 helps us to understand the link between these facts. It shows the 
answer given by this individual to some selected sequences in the first 77 rounds (period I) and in 
the last 77 ones (period III). 
For example, in the first period, the subject answers in all cases (100 percent) "very good" to the 
sequence yellow-circle-big. This sequence appears three times in the period (as we can see in the 
last column, where freq is equal to three). The coloured cell indicates the right answer. 
The answer "good" (confirmed even if wrong) to the sequence yellow-square-small is coherent with 
the routines developed (from the very beginning) for the sequences yellow-circle (or heart)-small. 
On the contrary, the right answer (not confirmed) "middle" for the sequence yellow-rectangle-big is 
not coherent with the system of rules emerging in the last part of the game, when "square" and 
"rectangle" are compared to "circle" and "heart". The system of rules developed (also the part which 
is not shown here) is then wrong but has an evident and intelligible internal coherence. 
Table 6 shows also answers to the sequence where the colour black appears. There is an evident 
analogy with sequences characterized by yellow. The sequences with blue (not shown) are similar 
to the black ones and the white ones are analogous to those with yellow
7. 
                                        
6 As the game is very long and repetitive, it seems reasonable to think that a subject who has developed a rule can make 
a mistake and give, in some cases, a different answer. Moreover, the rule could be in evolution and not perfectly defined 
at the beginning of what we define third period. That is the reason why we also use also a definition like "rule 75". 
7 It is evident, now, that the subject under exam is reasoning and not simply memorizing. Table 6. A more detailed analysis of the behaviour of the player analyzed in table 2. 
period Colour  Shape  dim.  Very  bad Bad  Middle Good  Very  Good  freq 
I  yellow  circle  Big              100%  3 
       Small           100%     5 
    heart  Big              100%  2 
       Small           80%  20% 5 
    square  Big                 0 
       Small           100%     4 
    rectangle  Big        50%     50%  4 
       Small                 0 
 black circle  Big           0 
      Small          0 
  heart  Big           0 
      Small          0 
   square  Big  50%  50%      4 
      Small  67%  33%      3  
   rectangle  Big  75%   25%     4 
      Small   40%  20% 40%    5 
III  yellow  circle  Big              100%  3 
       Small           100%     4 
    heart  Big              100%  1 
       Small           100%     3 
    square  Big              100%  1 
       Small           100%     4 
    rectangle  Big              100%  3 
       Small           100%     1 
 black circle  Big  100%         1 
      Small   100%       2 
  heart  Big  100%         2 
      Small   100%       1 
   square  Big  100%       3  
      Small   75%  25%     4 
   rectangle  Big  67%  33%      3 
      Small   100%      4  
 
This is just an example, but a similar system of rules emerges in many cases, and it is probably 
related to the order of appearance of the information during the experiment. In fact, at the beginning 
of the game there are many cases of bright-not angular shapes and of dark-angular shapes, i.e. the 
ones that receive a higher number of right answers. In this perspective, then, this result is coherent 
with the hypothesis of path-dependence in individual learning, stated at a theoretical level by 
Rizzello (2000) and by Egidi and Narduzzo (1996) in experiments on team organization
8. 
 
Apart from those who understand the right logical system, there are players who develop a set of 
rules that is partially different from the one in table 6 (in other words, they build a different 
knowledge of this experimental environment), though they start from the same configuration of the 
game and on the basis of similar cognitive devices. 
Consider in table 7 the final part of the game of another player. 
                                        
8 As some results could be context-specific, it is very important to find coherent results in different experiments.  
Table 7. The system of rules developed by a player different from those in table 6* 
period Colour  Shape  dim.  Very  bad Bad  Middle Good  Very  Good  freq 
III  yellow  circle  Big              100%  3 
       Small           100%     4 
    heart  Big              100%  1 
       Small           100%     3 
    square  Big           100%   1 
       Small        100%        4 
    rectangle  Big        33%  67%    3 
       Small        100%       1 
 black circle  Big      100%     1 
      Small   100%       2 
  heart  Big    50%  50%     2 
      Small   100%       1 
   square  Big    67%  33%     3 
      Small  50%  25%  25%     4 
   rectangle  Big    67%  33%     3 
      Small   100%      4 
*The bold character shows the last answer given to each sequence 
 
In table 7 there is more variance in the answers, but there are also some clear differences from table 
6. Black (and blue, not shown in table) is generally associated with the answer bad (the last choices 
shown in the table in bold character enforce the idea that this is the path of convergence), while the 
sequences with a yellow are almost always understood. 
 
Both systems of rules in table 6 and 7 are not optimal, as in some cases lead to wrong choices. Both 
of them have, yet, an important feature, as players' memory is bounded, like their mental energy: 
they are easy to remind and apply. 
 
2.2. An experiment on team learning 
 
This section describes the results of an experiment on team learning (see Novarese 2003 for more 
details and results). The experiment under exam is called "sum 10", and aims at analyzing if and 
how teams reach coordination in a situation of partially opposite incentives. "Sum 10" presents 
elements from games on both organizational learning and cooperation (trying to go beyond the 
simple traditional prisoner's dilemma). 
 
Two aspects emerge: 
- a strong effect of individual psychological traits (as measured by personality tests) on the 
behaviour in the experiment; 
- the usefulness of the interview realized at the end of the experiment to understand players' 
behaviour, motivations, aims … 
Both this points question, again, the ceteris paribus assumption. 
 
2.2.1 The experiment 
 
Team of three players are, anonymously and at random, built among participants. The game has 36 
rounds. Teams are stable throughout game. 
Each of the players has a set of numbers. This set remains unchanged in every round and is 
composed of the values: 0, 1, 3, 4, 10. 
In every round each player has to declare one of the number in his set. The numbers of the three people playing together are then summed. 
 
According to the sum, each player receives a payoff, following this rule: 
 
* if S(i) = 10, I(i)=40 - D(i) 
* if S(i) > 10, I(i)=30 - D(i) 
* if S(i) < 10, I(i)=0 - D(i) 
 
where  
S(i)= sum of the team I, of which player i is a member 
I(i)= player i: individual payoff 
D(i): number declared by player i 
 
Then subjects have to cooperate to reach a sum equal or higher than ten, by using the lowest 
possible number. 
In treatment group one, players know the total number of rounds; while in treatment two they do not 
receive such information. 
 
The players’ behaviour can be influenced by many, interrelated elements. These considerations 
have general appliances to almost all experiments, but for some of them (as this one) they are 
probably more important. 
- The first and obvious element is their actual comprehension of the experiment. Even if the game is 
not difficult, some players show very strange behaviours and sometimes, the interview realized after 
the game show their wrong comprehension or interpretation of the game (apparently this problem 
did not emerge in the example shown in the previous paragraph). 
- Subjects can participate in the experiment with many and different motivations. The introduction 
of a remuneration (as prescribed in the most important handbooks, like Hey, 1991) is supposed to 
stimulate at least a reasonable degree of care, since subjects should have the same motivations 
which are presumed in the theory to test. 
Sometimes this reward can be unnecessary. In fact, important results (for example Allais, 1956) 
have been reached in experiments with no reward. Sometimes students (the main experimental 
subjects) attend experiments with motivations different from monetary reward, for example their 
interest in the subject or just their curiosity. Besides, during the game they can be involved in the 
accomplishment of that peculiar task, independently of the reward. But these facts, inevitably, lead 
to a loss of control, at least in relation to the standard view of the laboratory. Besides, experiments 
are usually similar to games, and people like games. It is not impossible that they react and behave 
differently from experimenters' and theories' hopes (making more points as possible and getting the 
highest reward). On the contrary they can play just for fun or even to experiment the behaviour of 
their partners. 
- The attitude toward other players, that can be seen in terms of dichotomies: altruism vs. egoism, 
free riding vs. giving, rationality vs. emotionality and desire of being reciprocated
9. 
The attitude toward other members of the team (and, as a consequence, altruism or egoism) can 
depend on each subject's motivation in participating in the experiment. A player interested in 
"making money" will probably behave differently from one who is enjoying the game. 
- Subjects should be able to coordinate their choices by communicating their own eventual 
strategies and/or understanding those of the others. Using the language of game theory, we could 
say that the experiment has many possible equilibria (like a game or a super-game). Subjects should 
coordinate to reach one of these. 
 
                                        
9 There is an extensive theoretical and experimental literature on this subject. It is not possible to analyze it here. For a 
review see Novarese (2002a and 2002b). All such (different) behaviours and motivations emerge from the recalled interview conducted 
before the end of the experiment. Usually experimental papers seem to neglect this problem, though 
it has important effects on the behaviour during the game. We will analyse this issue in detail in the 
next paragraphs. 
 
This experiment was realized in Alessandria, at the Centre for Cognitive Economics, in May 2000; 
36 subjects (students in law) participated. The software used was developed by Swiee (Boero, 2001) 
 
2.2.3. Psychological traits and behaviour in the experiment 
 
The effects of personality traits on individual economic behaviour have been studied, for example, 
in relation with egoist/altruist behaviour by Boone et al (1999). They propose a survey and new 
empirical evidence leading to the conclusion that the personality of the players matters. In this and 
other papers, players' personality is analysed with appropriate psychological tests and related to the 
behaviour in the experiment (usually the Prisoner's dilemma or similar games). In many cases a 
relation between attitude to cooperation and psychological traits emerges. 
 
A similar analysis is proposed here, connecting the behaviour in the game "sum 10" with individual 
extroversion, measured with Eysenck and Wilson’ test (1975). This aspect of human personality, as 
recalled by Boone et al (1999), could influence behaviour in experiments on cooperation. 
 
Box 1 describes Eysenck and Wilson's test. Box 2 presents the empirical analysis. 
The most important result is that introverted individuals get a higher mean score in the game. The 
variable "extroversion/introversion" accounts for about 25 percent of the variance in the score 
among individuals. Then this individual psychological trait has an important role in determining 
individual (but also organizational) performance in this experiment. 
 
Box 1 
Eysenck and Wilson's test measures extroversion and introversion along seven dimensions, defined 






- practicalness/  reflectiveness 
- irresponsibility/responsibility 
For each of this dichotomy, the test, based on 210 questions, proposes a score ranging from zero to 
thirty. As specified by the authors, the individual score should be compared with those of a 
reference population. The absolute level of the variables has, in fact, for itself, low significance. 
According to the position in each of the seven distributions, it is possible to state whether an 
individual is extroverted or introverted. 
Introversion is related to the predominance of high values of the first term of each of the 
dichotomies. 
 Box 2 
Subjects were first assigned to one of the side of the distribution (above or below the appropriate 
median) for each of the seven dichotomies in box 1. Then subjects with values above the median in 
the distribution of at least four of the seven variables, were classified as "extroverted". 
This procedure has obviously its limits (for example, does not account for possible differences in 
the variables that define extroversion) but it is coherent with the ideas of Eysenck and Wilson. 
Besides it allows us to build two groups composed of individuals with significantly different 
psychological traits. 
The group of extroverted individuals was composed of twelve subjects (six from each of the 
treatment). 
Different analyses are possible on the two groups. Here attention is focused on differences in the 
score (i.e. the main measure of performance) realized in the experiment. 
Table 8a. and 8b. propose the results of the analysis of the variance aimed at comparing mean 
scores among extroverted and introverted subjects, controlling for the treatment group. 
The following equation was then estimated: 
score(i)= intercept+ a * introversion + b * treatment    (I) 
 
where: 
- extroverted = 1 if individual is classified as "extroverted"; 0 elsewhere 
- knowing_rounds = 1 if treatment group is 1 (subject knows the number of rounds); 0 elsewhere 
 


















The group composed of extrovert individuals has a mean score significantly lower than the 
introverted one. On the contrary, there are no significant differences among treatments related to the 
information on the number of rounds. 
 
At a first glance, this result might be surprising. Extroversion, in facts, is supposed to be associable 
to a tendency to cooperate. In this experiment, extroverted get worse results. It is yet necessary to 
observe that "sum 10" is also a game of coordination. Some attitudes of extroverted individuals 
(such as activity, impulsivity, irresponsibility …) can hinder the reaching of this goal. These 
individuals, in fact, can try to impose their own focal points and strategies, or react in a "stranger" 
way to others’ choices. Introverted individuals are, on the contrary, more adaptive and more prone 
to understand the behaviour of other players (in certain respects, it is comparable to a rational 
  df sum of squares mean square F value P value
Model  2 434118.8 217059.4 4.792218 0.01
Error  29 1313530 45294.14   
Total  31 1747649        
   Coefficient Standard error Stat t P value 
Intercept  1079.76 60.66 17.79 0.0001 
Introversion  -29.13 77.71 3.07 0.0045 
knowing_rounds  -29.125 75.24 -0.39 0.7015 
   
R squared=0.25   
standard error=212.8   behaviour). Besides, as in this game there is no direct communication, extroversion might result less 
useful. 
In other kinds of organizational tasks, personal psychological traits can have different effects on the 
performance. 
 
2.2.4. Interviews on the behaviour in the game 
After the end of the game "sum 10", players were required to describe, in a written interview, their 
strategies, their perception of the other members of their group (partners or rivals?) and of their 
behaviour. 
While similar interviews are probably quite common among experimentalists, there are no 
standards in their realization and presentation. Normally, then, the results are not proposed at all in 
the papers
10. 
Why? The reasons are probably related to the recalled applications and aims of experimental 
economics in the traditional approach. If scientists are interested in testing theories and their 
validity, moving from the paper to reality, interviews become useless. Their interest, in fact, is not 
focused on understanding players' behaviour, but on testing a theory or hypothesis in a more 
realistic environment. 
The problem is that differences among players (even if not under analysis) can make the same test 
of theories more difficult, introducing variance and "errors of measure". 
Consider the following examples. 
 
Graph 1 shows one of the team playing the game, reporting individual choices in every round and 
the relative sum. 
The team under exam gets a sum equal to ten only in a few rounds of the game. In other rounds they 
go above or below this number. In the interview, yet, all players express their satisfaction, in quite 
similar words: "we were able to reach ten in some of the rounds, without using costly strategies (i.e. 
strategies requiring to declare ten)". Then, these players' expectation were not those of reaching 
always the maximum goal. This is an important information that can be useful to explain their 
performance in relation to other groups, which were able to reach ten for almost all the game. These 
other players, in fact, show generally very different goals, declaring sometimes regret for the few 
rounds in which they have not been able to get the best result
11. 
 
Graph. 1 The game played by one of the team in the experiment "sum 10" 
                                        
10 Andreoni, 1995 (p. 898) talks about this kind of interview, but in a methodological paper. 
11 In the interview, player one in graph 1 explained also the reason for the choice at round 17. After having played three 
or four, he decided "to save some points". This apparent strange choice, thus, is not a signal sent to other members of 
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r oun ds
player 1 player 2 player 3 sumMany problems and risks are related to the use of this kind of interviews. In relation to the example: 
subjects might have changed their level of expectation during the game, and in the interview they 
might have expressed only their final opinions (it would be necessary
12 to test satisfaction also 
before and during the game). Besides, some players' statements result completely useless. In other 
cases it is not easy to link interview and real behaviour (because people did not express their ideas 
clearly). Then, there could be a possible distortion in using only the part of the interview that seem 
useful. 
But it seems undeniable that sometimes these statements give useful information and allow a better 
comprehension of players' behaviour in the game; therefore it would be absurd to ignore them. 
 
See another example in graph 2. The main obstacle to the reaching of a stable equilibrium, for this 
team, seems the behaviour of player 1. He changes his strategies many times and break the 
equilibria. The interview gives interesting insights. His strange behaviour originates from the 
willingness to play and reach the goal in different ways and not just in one. He is not so interested 
in getting top scores, but he likes playing, and he tries to avoid repetitiveness. 
In other cases, not shown here, the reasons at the basis of the difficulties in getting a stable 
equilibrium rely on the willingness of some players to reciprocate others. These players cannot 
accept that one of the other members of the team is forced to play a more costly strategy. 
 
These examples show the variety of motivations and the usefulness of interviews (as, like 
psychological tests, they can help to better understand players' behaviour and also to create 
appropriate "control variables") and so the necessity to develop scientific criteria and appropriate 
methodologies to perform them (on this, see also Simon, 2000). 
 
Graph. 2 The game played by another team in the experiment "sum 10" 
 
3. Experiments and simulations 
 
While there are relatively few papers focused on "cognitive experimental economics", in the last 
years there has been a growing diffusion of papers on agent-based simulations (Gilbert and Terna, 
2000). 
Sometimes the term experiment is used also for simulations with artificial agents, as they shows 
many features usually related to scientific empirical analysis. In fact, these models allow observing 
emergent unpredictable phenomena, starting from a population of evolving and learning agents. 
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player 1 player 2 player 3 sumOnce the modeller has fixed initial conditions and built the environment, he has just to observe 
without intervention, as in a "culture-dish laboratory experiment" (Tesfatsion, 2002, p. 2). 
The interrelation between experimental economics and agent based computational economics has 
increased because of the frequent use of common sets and games (the classical example are the tests 
of Axelrod, 1984, on prisoner's dilemma, widely carried out both with human and artificial agents). 
 
As simulations are today easier to realize than experiments with human agents, and as they also 
show some advantages (for example there is no risk that players might misunderstand the rules of 
the game or have unpredictable motivations), it is not difficult to understand why they are so 
diffused. And the following question seems reasonable: why not using simulations instead of 
experiments? 
The answer is easy: simulations are not the same as experiments, and artificial agents are not human 
agents. 
Tesfatsion (2002) analyzes some of the possible risks and problems related to simulations. Two of 
them should be remembered here. The results obtained in simulations can be strongly affected by 
the representation of learning processes and by the parameters-values setting used. There are 
inevitably many risks. For example, as "many of these learning representations were originally 
developed with global optimality objectives in mind" (Testfation, 2002, p. 3), results could be the 
same as those of neoclassical models. In fact, if agents (real or artificial) were similar to the 
traditional homo oeconomicus, experiments would be useless, as the same results of the theory 
would constantly emerge. 
 
Therefore, experiments and simulations are not alternative ways of gathering data. On the contrary, 
they can be usefully integrated. Tesfatsion (2002) suggests that experiments can help fixing 
parameters and decision models to be used in simulations.  
As we have seen in the previous chapter, experiments always show unexpected results related to 
participants’ behaviour. Some of the related heterogeneity can be considered as a noise and it could 
be useful to eliminate it. In other cases heterogeneity depends on individuals' peculiarity, and it is 
an unavoidable part of the world. 
Only by means of a really empirically-founded research program these features can be recognised. 
If simulations want to start from reality, and not from a hypothetical world (even if it is different 
from the neoclassical one), the cooperation with experimental economics is necessary. Moreover, 
the analytical power of simulations can be fully expressed if it is used to account for the variety and 
complexity of the real world (as shown by experiments), which is impossible to manage through 
usual models. 
 
On the other hand, simulations can also help to understand and read experimental data, comparing 
hypothetical agents and real ones (Tesfatsion, 2002). 
But there is also another way of integrating experimental economics and simulations, exemplified 
by an application of "sum 10" performed at the Turin University, in collaboration with the Centre 
for Cognitive Economics and described in Novarese (2003). In this case artificial and human agents 
play together. Artificial agents are used to create specific situations and training environments for 
humans. For example, in the application recalled, a group of subjects played the first part of the 
game with two artificial egoist agents. Another group interacted with artificial altruist agents. In this 
way, it is possible to evaluate possible differences in the performance, by carrying out later a game 




Cognitive economics imposes and suggests a series of methodological and instrumental novelties in 
the realization of experiments and in the analysis of data. Some of these novelties interest mainly the works related to this approach; others have a more 
general appliance. 
 
One of the main aspects that emerged here, in different ways, is a definite heterogeneity among 
individuals. This heterogeneity depends partly on the fact that experiments are artificial situations 
carried out in a laboratory and subjects react to this environment in different ways (in term of 
motivations and aims, for example). 
Other differences are, instead, a reflex of the nature of human beings. Laboratory is not a neutral 
place. Subjects bring with them their personal and idiosyncratic knowledge, ideas, experience … 
The laboratory environment cannot eliminate these differences. 
All these factors cause a loss of control, as they question the validity of the ceteris paribus 
condition. Subjects are, in fact, different, even when acting in identical experimental conditions. 
If we are interested in testing whether a theory resists when we pass from the books to the real 
world, we can probably neglect these problems; but we have to remember them if we want to 
explain why people behave in a particular way. 
 
Complex environments, instead of simple games, are also necessary in order to advance in the 
understanding of human behaviour. 
Inevitably these experiments are sometimes less controlled and also more difficult to manage. Data 
gathered in this way are necessarily more difficult to read. Yet, such experiments give rise to new 
opportunities, like that of discovering unplanned events (if researchers are opened to look at them). 
As well known, also penicillin has been discovered thanks to an accident! 
Often the apparent "noises", which emerge in an unexpected way, are very interesting. The 
satisfacing behaviour manifested by some experimental players could create problems, but it shows, 
again, the validity of Simon's model. Apparently strange choices make it very difficult to 
understand and read data, but are sometimes the result of innovative tendencies induced by 
boredom of repetitive behaviour (see Witt, 1993 for a theoretical analysis of this mechanism). 
 
We have seen that an individual analysis of data, especially if guided by psychological tests and 
post-experiment interviews, can help understanding these phenomena. But these new methodologies 
and procedures need to be studied, fully understood and developed. More analyses and specific 
tests, will probably be necessary to make these novelties accepted by the scientific community, but 
their indications are already so strong that they cannot be neglected. 
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